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Abstract 
By employing non-parametric methods, namely Data Envelopment Analysis and Malmquist Index, this paper investigates 
efficiency of banks using a database of almost all banks in four countries in South-East Europe. The superior efficiency of foreign-
owned banks in intermediation is supported. It is argued that the improvement in efficiency of banks originated from the change in 
technology rather than scale and technical efficiency, and banks on average have not been able to catch-up with best-performers, 
thus widening the efficiency gap. The largest sources of inefficiency are found to be cost and scale inefficiencies and lending 
shortfalls. Because of its peculiarities, Kosovo banking sector is assessed relative to other economies. Findings suggest that despite 
some improvements, the banking system in Kosovo remained less efficient. A number of policy implications emanate from the 
findings, aiming at enhancing the intermediation efficiency of banks in the context of South-East European transition. 
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1. Introduction 
The relative performance of banks in a market is an essential question for analysis, especially for the South-East 
Europe (SEE) region that has lagged behind other transition economies, now members of the EU, in banking sector 
intermediation - despite deep transformation and reforms in the industry undertaken in the first decade. Given that 
banks are the most important source of external finance for the real sector in SEE, it is vital for policymakers to 
improve the efficiency of banks in intermediation while maintaining stability. Thus, in this paper intermediation 
efficiency of banks in four SEE countries is investigated, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo and Montenegro in the 
period 2002-2005.  
In the early transition years, SEE countries faced serious challenges in reforming their banking sectors. Subsequently, 
the states aimed to develop efficient and stable banking systems by allowing foreign banks to enter, on the assumption 
that this will contribute to efficiency improvements. If foreign banks are more efficient, then an important question to 
be addressed in this paper is whether there is an overall efficiency improvement in the sector and whether there is any 
convergence in the efficiency of domestic and foreign banks. Also an important question to be addressed is the 
intermediation efficiency of banks by the size of the operation, i.e. if inefficiencies are driven by the sub-optimal scale 
size, in the light of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of banks in some SEE countries.  
This paper puts special emphasis on the case of Kosovo by examining the extent to which the banking sector has been 
able to catch-up with other countries. Also the period of investigation is suitable for comparisons, given that the 
banking sector in Kosovo was established from scratch, period 2000-2001 was characterized with new bank entries 
while in 2005 the banking sector was already an established market. But then underwent structural changes since 
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2006. In 2006 there was one bank bankruptcy and in 2007-2008 there were new entries and some M&As. Therefore, 
the period 2002-2005 was characterized with a stable structure of the banking sector in Kosovo, making an interesting 
case for comparing countries with and without stable structures. Furthermore, the global financial crisis that followed 
staged substantial changes in banking sectors globally, including the SEE region, which is beyond the scope of this 
study.       
The research questions will be explored by employing Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist Total 
Factor Productivity Change Index, which measure the relative efficiency of banks in the SEE from the intermediation 
point of view using bank-level data. DEA efficiency is estimated for the four SEE countries as a group, several 
sensitivity tests are employed and the sources of inefficiency are estimated. Also the technical efficiency change, 
technological change and scale efficiency change on the total factor productivity change is assessed. Finally, some 
conclusions and policy implications are derived from the analysis. 
2. The method  
The technical efficiency concept in economics refers to the minimization of inputs used by a firm to produce a given 
level of outputs or the maximization of outputs produced by a given set of inputs under a given state of technology. 
However, for any given firm or industry the absolute level of efficiency is unknown. What may be known is the 
efficiency of a firm relative to another firm or the industry, which is the reference efficiency giving rise to the frontier 
analysis. The empirical implications of these concepts have been tested by using both econometric and linear 
programming techniques. Among the non-parametric techniques, formalized first by Charnes, et al. (1978), the DEA is 
widely used for efficiency measurement in many industries, including banking. A problem with the use of parametric 
methods in banking is that they require data on input and output prices (cost, revenue or profit function), which are 
usually not easy to obtain. Apart from data availability, prices derived from a bank’s financial statements are 
endogenous to the bank’s behaviour leading to the misspecification of the efficient frontier in the presence of market 
power making the use of price data inadvisable (Pastor et al., 1997; Bos and Kool, 2006). Compared to parametric 
approaches, an advantage of DEA is that it performs well with small samples, does not require the specification of the 
functional form and can analyze multiple input-multiple output models, can identify the sources of inefficiency and 
does not suffer from the possibility of misspecification error and endogeneity. However, the DEA does not take into 
account any noise and the difference between the efficiency score of an entity and the frontier is all attributed to 
inefficiency. In this paper, this disadvantage of the method is addressed with some tests such as stability of the 
efficiency scores over time and the sensitivity of the efficiency scores to outliers.  
DEA is a non-parametric linear programming technique used in assessing the relative efficiency of comparable firms 
such as banks. Banks use some inputs, e.g. labor and capital, in order to produce some outputs, e.g. loans. The DEA 
method, enables the construction of a frontier as a linear combination of efficient firms with the best combination of 
inputs and outputs. Any deviation of a particular observation from the efficient frontier is attributed to inefficiency. 
DEA assumes that all entities under investigation face the same (unspecified) technology, differentials in input costs 
or product differentiation are not taken into account explicitly, thus, it accounts for technical efficiency. It is important 
to note that technical inefficiency of financial institutions has generally been found to dominate scale and product mix 
inefficiencies (Aly et al., 1990; Isik and Hassan, 2002). 
The original DEA formulation by Charnes, et al. (1978) assumed constant returns to scale (CRS), i.e. all firms operate 
at their optimal scale. This assumption has been criticized since, for example, it has been found that in practice the 
banking sector exhibits non-constant returns to scale (McAllister and McManus, 1993; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999). 
Factors that may cause banks not to operate at the optimal scale include market power, regulatory requirements, 
M&As, etc. Banker, et al. (1984) extend the CRS version of DEA to take into account the possibility of variable 
returns to scale (VRS). The formal treatment of the methodology in a multiple input-multiple output case follows the 
standard exposition (Cooper et al., 2000; Ramanathan, 2003). Denoting with yj the vector of outputs, xi the vector of 
inputs, vj and ui the output and input weights, respectively, n the number of firms to be evaluated and m the particular 
firm whose efficiency is to be measured (Em), in the output-oriented case formally we have:  
 
Toçi & Hashi/International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies Vol 2, No 3, 2013  ISSN: 2147-4486 
3 
 
 




I
i
imim
J
j
jmjm
m
xu
yv
MaxE
1
1                                                              (1) 
            s.t. 
 1
1
1 




I
i
inim
J
j
jnjm
xu
yv
                                                                          (2)  
             n = 1,2,…,N; vj, ui > 0   
 
In DEA, multiple inputs and outputs are linearly aggregated using weights and the efficiency of the firm is defined as a 
ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs. DEA assigns a unique (or the best) set of weights to each firm which are 
determined so as to maximize its efficiency (1), subject to the condition that the efficiency of other firms (calculated 
using the same set of weights) is constrained to less than or equal to unity (2). This mathematical program produces 
the efficiency of only one firm, m. For n firms in the sample, n such programs have to be solved. However, this 
mathematical function has an infinite number of solutions. The problem can be reformulated into a linear 
programming format by constraining the numerator or the denominator of the efficiency ratio to be equal to unity:  
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In the output-oriented DEA, the objective function is to maximize the weighted sum of outputs for firm m (3), 
while keeping the weighted sum of inputs constrained to unity (4); thus the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted 
inputs for other firms is constrained to be less than one (5). This is equivalent to the constraint 5, since:
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.   This linear programme is an output-maximization DEA programme
which implies that other firms cannot produce more output than the reference firm m, if it is efficient. The DEA 
programmes involving weights for inputs and outputs (vj and ui) are called 'multiplier DEA' programmes. Those 
involving weights for firms ( – denoting the vector of weights) and the efficiency measure for the firm under 
evaluation ( ) are 'envelopment DEA' programmes. For each firm under investigation, the linear program finds the 
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set of weights that maximize efficiency subject to constraints. For the mth firm, the general envelopment DEA 
programme corresponding to the output-oriented CRS model can be presented as follows:  
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The objective function is the identification of the maximum feasible expansion of outputs for the firm m (6), 
without violating best practice since those firms will have the weighted linear combination of output at least as great 
as that of firm m. So, the firm m is inefficient if the linear combination of other firms can be found which produce 
more output (7) and the weighted linear combination of inputs will not exceed the input usage of the firm m (8). This 
implies that the output of the firm m should not exceed the linear combination of other firms, unless it is efficient. If 
the maximum   is unity then the firm m is efficient and will lie on the frontier and its output would equal to that of 
other firms forming the frontier. If this is the case then 
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combination of firms in a dataset can be found which produce more output levels, by utilizing the same input levels. 
The firms fulfilling this condition will create the efficiency frontier enveloping all other data points. So   and   are 
variables which need to be calculated, and the linear programming problem must be solved for each firm in order to 
obtain its respective  . Each efficiency score will be either = 1, those units that form the frontier and imply 
benchmark efficiency, or 0 < < 1 implying relative inefficiency compared to the benchmark. Relative efficiency 
implies that there is no absolute measure of efficiency. Having = 1 does not necessarily imply that firms are 
efficient, but they are not less efficient than other firms in the sample.  
As considered above, the CRS model is appropriate when firms operate at the optimal scale. Banker, et al. (1984) 
proposed an extension of this model to account for variable returns to scale. This necessitates one more restriction for 
convexity of envelopment surface:
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in efficiency with respect to scale of operation and measures pure technical efficiency. Scale efficiency (Se) can be 
measured as a ratio of CRS and VRS efficiency scores, with Se = 1 indicating cases when firms operate at the most 
efficient scale (size). If Se < 1 then firms operate at a sub-optimum ('wrong') scale. 1 – Se indicates the relative scale 
inefficiency (Si) of the particular firm.  
DEA measures in input or output orientation estimate the same frontier and the results for efficient entities are the 
same. For inefficient entities the projected efficiency point on the frontier may differ between input and output 
orientation. Given that linear programming cannot suffer from statistical problems such as simultaneous equation bias, 
the choice of an appropriate orientation (input or output) is not a crucial issue as it is in econometric modeling (Fried 
et al., 1993). Often the choice of orientation depends on the objective of the study. Given the interest in the 
intermediary role of banks, a more natural choice is the output orientation, i.e. given the deposits, how much increase 
in lending to the domestic real sector can be attained. In the case of intermediation approach where the volume of 
deposits is treated as input, conceptually one should choose output orientation. If input orientation is chosen then that 
Toçi & Hashi/International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies Vol 2, No 3, 2013  ISSN: 2147-4486 
5 
 
would mean achieving same level of outputs (loans), while minimizing inputs employed (deposits), which is 
counterintuitive.  
Efficiency frontiers are not static over time since the production technology may change, causing positive or negative 
shifts in the best practice efficiency frontier. DEA results can show that there has been no substantial improvement in 
the average efficiency in the banking sector, which does not necessarily mean that the productivity has declined. The 
change in banks’ technology may have led a few banks to take advantage of the new technology which shifted the 
efficiency frontier outwards while the average bank may have failed to catch-up and take advantage of the new 
technology, thus, becoming increasingly less efficient relative to frontier banks, though not necessarily less efficient in 
absolute terms. Hence a 'natural' extension of DEA is the Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Change Index 
(hereinafter MI). Caves, et al. (1982) introduced the MI by using distance functions. Extensions to Caves, et al. (1982) 
entailed the use of DEA in measuring the distance functions and decomposing total factor productivity change into 
technical efficiency change and change in technology (Färe et al., 1994; Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1997, 1999). 
Provided that the MI is obtained by measuring distance functions using DEA, it can be decomposed into four 
components: technical efficiency change due to VRS assumption, i.e. pure technical efficiency change (∆PTE), scale 
efficiency change (∆SE), the product of the two giving technical efficiency change due to the CRS assumption (∆TE), 
and the technological change or frontier shift effect (∆T). The product of all four components gives total factor 
productivity change (MI). Following Wheelock and Wilson (1999) and Isik and Hassan (2003), the DEA-based 
Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Change Index (MI) can be decomposed as follows:  
 
 
 
(9) 
 
 
             
The first term outside the square brackets (∆PTE) is a measure of pure technical efficiency change between two 
periods assuming VRS; the first term in square brackets (∆SE) represents the change in scale efficiency. The product 
of ∆PTE and ∆SE is the overall technical efficiency change (∆TE). The last term in the square brackets represents the 
frontier shift effect or change in the technology (∆T) assuming CRS and the product of all the above gives the MI. For 
example, if technical efficiency experiences a decline between the two periods or the scale of operation is away from 
technically optimal scale, then this negatively contributes to the change in MI. MI and each of its components can be 
calculated for each adjacent pair of years. For example, as in the case in this paper, for four year period (2002-2005) 
there will be MI and its components for three pairs of years. 
3. The application of parametric approaches and DEA in measuring bank efficiency in Transition Economies 
The literature on the efficiency of banks in transition economies (TEs) is relatively scarce though growing, with the 
parametric approach dominating the non-parametric approach. In general, parametric studies mainly focus on cost, 
revenue and/or profit efficiency by assessing the ownership structure of banks and privatization impacts. The studies 
cover the first decade of transition when many countries faced privatization challenges and the banking crisis were 
widespread. Policy decisions had to be made in the light of anticipation that the presence of foreign banks would 
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exception worth discussing is Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) who find that state-owned and old private banks in Croatia 
were more efficient than the newly established private and foreign banks. The authors relate this 'abnormality' to the 
limited competition and start-up difficulties of the new banks. Although this explanation seems reasonable, it should 
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be noted that the period of investigation preceded the crisis of 1998. Systematic misreporting of data by the banks 
might have been the reason for that outcome. As Grigorian and Manole (2002) have pointed out, the early and mid-
transition period was characterized by serious misreporting and non-compliance and this may have been the case in 
Croatia since the regulatory and supervisory mechanisms, accounting standards and an effective corporate governance 
framework were not yet in place.     
Table 1. Bank efficiency studies in transition employing parametric methods 
 
Author(s) Methodology Period of investigation 
Number of 
countries 
Foreign banks 
found to be more 
efficient than 
domestic banks 
Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) SFA 1994-95  1 no 
Kraft, et al. (2002)  SFA 1994-2000  1 yes 
Nikiel and Opiela (2002) SFA 1993-98 1 yes 
Hasan and Marton (2003) SFA 1993-97 1 yes 
Green, et al. (2003)  SFA 1995-1999  9 no 
Yildirim and Philipatos (2003) SFA 1993-2000 12 yes 
Weill (2003)  SFA 1997 2 yes 
Bonin, et al. (2004) SFA 1996-2000 11 yes 
Matousek (2004) DFA 1994-2001  8 yes 
Fries and Taci (2004) SFA 1994-2001  15 yes 
Matousek and Taci (2005) DFA 1993-1998 1 yes 
Kasman and Yildirim (2006)  SFA 1995-2002 8 no 
 
A potential problem with most of the surveyed studies is their coverage of banks by the dataset. The cross-country 
studies use the Bankscope database that covers banks with financial statements audited by reputable foreign firms. In 
some cases banks included in the database represent well below 50 percent of the market. Banks that are mainly larger 
and sounder tend to be in this database. Consequently, the frontier models in these studies are probably measuring the 
efficiency of the most efficient banks without indicating the overall position of the sector. In addition, cost or revenue 
efficiency models that that do not account for both (costs and revenues at the same time) may not be appropriate. As 
Berger and Mester (2003) point out ‘a banker’s decision that raises both costs and revenues, but raises revenues by 
more than it raises costs, will appropriately be counted as an improvement in performance in profit maximization, but 
may be counted as deterioration under cost minimization.’ If the intermediation context is added to this observation, 
e.g. apart from maximizing profits the ability of banks to transform deposits into loans, then a multiple input-multiple 
output modeling of a banking firm may be more appropriate, which can be handled with non-parametric techniques.  
The literature on the application of non-parametric approaches, specifically DEA, in measuring banking efficiency in 
TEs is scarce. Grigorian and Manole (2002) employ DEA for bank-level data for 17 TEs for the period 1995-1998. 
The authors found that the privatization of banks, unless controlled by foreign owners, does not result in significant 
improvements in efficiency. Stavarek (2003) estimates a common efficiency frontier for commercial banks in Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia using DEA for the period 1999-2002, on samples of banks numbering from 59 
to 72 in various years. The author found that no improvement in efficiency was evident in the period under review 
(except in Hungary), greater efficiency is found in the Czech and Hungarian banking sectors and foreign and large 
banks tended to be more efficient.  
Individual country cases applying DEA in measuring bank efficiency are also scarce. Jemric and Vujcic (2002) used 
DEA to analyze the efficiency of banks in Croatia in the period 1995-2000. Contrary to the findings of Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu (1998), they found that foreign and new banks were more efficient than domestic and older banks and that a 
strong equalization in terms of average efficiency of banks had been experienced in Croatia, i.e. there has been a 
convergence in the sector, which may have been the result of the spillover effects of foreign banks, an increase in 
competition, etc. The sources of inefficiency in state-owned and old banks were attributed to their large number of 
employees and large fixed assets. Havrylchyk (2006) investigated bank efficiency using DEA in Poland for 1997-2001 
to study the ownership effect and the efficiency improvement of banks over time. His results suggest that foreign 
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banks were more efficient than domestic banks, though this as a result of foreign banks acquiring the most efficient 
domestic institutions ('cherry picking') and they have not succeeded in enhancing their efficiency further.  
To summarize, efficiency studies in transition yield mixed evidence in relation to the view that foreign banks are more 
efficient than domestic banks. The foreign bank contribution to the deepening of the financial intermediation in the 
domestic real sector has not been studied extensively in the multiple input-multiple output modeling using DEA. This 
is especially the case for the SEE region. This paper contributes to this literature, among others, by analyzing the 
differences between foreign and domestic banks’ efficiency specifically related to their function as intermediaries, 
supplemented with the efficiency measurement of the banking industry by size of operation, cross-country differences, 
etc.  
4. The definition of inputs and outputs 
Selecting appropriate input and output variables is perhaps the most important step in using DEA since it determines 
the evaluating context of the comparison (Yeh, 1996). There is a divergence and remains an open question in the 
literature about the correct definition of inputs and outputs in banking. There is some agreement that loans and other 
interest bearing assets should be treated as outputs. However, there is a disagreement on the classification of deposits 
as the main ingredient for loan production and other earning assets (an input) or as a service provided to clients and 
resource consuming activity (an output).  
In general, there are some approaches that most studies use and, to some extent, the choice may be settled depending 
on which approach is adopted. For example, the production approach views banks as producers of services for 
depositors and borrowers, e.g. administering customer accounts and transactions, cashing cheques and issuing loans, 
while using some combination of labor and capital as inputs. A variant of the production approach, known in the 
literature as the value-added approach, treats as bank outputs those activities that have value added in the sense that 
they incur significant labor and capital costs. As a result, both asset and liability items may have input and output 
characteristics and outputs are defined on the basis of the resource consuming activity that a particular bank product 
represents.  
The intermediation approach, pioneered by Sealey and Lindley (1977), views banks as intermediaries between the 
savers and borrowers, considering deposits as inputs which are the source of bank lending. It ignores the output 
characteristics of deposits in providing liquidity and payment services to customers, and as a resource consuming 
activity in the banking business. A variant of the intermediation approach is the asset approach which treats loans and 
other interest bearing assets of banks as their main outputs. Another variant, the profit approach, is concerned with 
profit maximization where all cost and revenue components are decision variables to be optimized by bank managers 
(Mlima and Hjalmarsson, 2002).  
The risk-management approach is a departure from the intermediation approach, incorporating risk management, 
information processing and monitoring activities of the bank (Colwell and Davis, 1992; Mester, 1996). Risk 
management characteristics were often ignored in previous studies. For example, banks could boost their lending 
activity by extending loans on unsound base resulting in bank instability and failure. Thus, one of the missing 
ingredients in the intermediation approach is covered by the risk-management approach by introducing the quality of 
bank assets. If available, the data on NPLs can be used to correct for overall lending activity of the bank. However, 
usually the data on NPLs are difficult to obtain and approximations such as loans net of provisioning are considered. 
The ability of banks to transform deposits into loans directed towards domestic real sector emphasizes the 
intermediary role of banks and as such is the main motivation for following the intermediation approach in this paper. 
The variables consist of two inputs and two outputs with deposits and total costs being considered as the bank inputs, 
and loans net of provisions and total revenues as outputs. Total costs include interest expenditures and non-interest 
expenditures such as salaries, expenditures related to fixed assets, administrative expenses and similar, excluding taxes 
to avoid any distortion. Total revenues include interest income and non-interest income such as fees and commission 
income, income from the trading portfolio, etc. Unlike some studies which take interest and non-interest revenues and 
expenditures separately, the data are aggregated into the total cost and total revenues for several reasons.  
First, it is debatable to what extent the data on inputs (or outputs) should be disaggregated. Apart from the unsettled 
problem of the input/output definition in banking, there is also the problem of the disaggregating measures used. On 
the input side, just to mention a few, there are labor and capital inputs. Banks spend resources on personnel which can 
be disaggregated into clerical and managerial. The capital input is usually taken to be a fixed asset (the balance sheet 
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or income statement item), although banks also spend resources on information technology and marketing which are 
important parts of the cost structure in modern banking. On the output side, e.g. loans, the list of disaggregation may 
also be long. For example, loans may be broken down by economic sector, maturity, type of borrowers and all these 
may be considered as different products given their different input usage, specific risks, etc.  
The degree of disaggregation of data also depends on the aims of the researcher. If the precise source of inefficiency is 
to be captured, then as detailed a breakdown as possible would be necessary. For example, disaggregating between 
labor and fixed assets would be appropriate for the management of the bank, e.g. if the source of the inefficiency is 
overstaffing, then this information may be very important for improving efficiency in this respect. However, if the 
interest is in more general characteristics of the banking sector, as it is the case in this paper, i.e. how the ownership 
structure and size (foreign vs. domestic banks; large vs. small banks) affect efficiency, then the detailed breakdown, 
even though informative, would not be of much of relevance. As a result, on the input side, total costs would capture 
all the operational spectrum of banking activity including staff, marketing, information technology, interest 
expenditures, etc.  
To some extent this choice of inputs and outputs in this paper may be considered as a 'mixed approach' since some 
important elements of all approaches are taken into account.  
First, it is a version of the intermediation approach since deposits are defined as inputs and the role of banks in the 
intermediation process is captured by loans treated as outputs.  
Second, to control for banks undertaking too much risk – the risk-management approach – net loans (after provisions) 
are used, which assumes appropriate provisioning by banks which in turn depends on the supervisory capacity of the 
regulator. Given that excessive risk taking would imply a waste of resources and disintermediation rather than 
intermediation, the use of loans net of provisioning will take into account risk preferences. If under-provisioning is an 
issue, then this would not be captured by the data given that data on the quality of assets are not available. However, to 
some extent this is also picked up in the interest income (as part of total revenue) which would capture the actual 
returns on loans.  
Third, by having total costs as an input and total revenues as an output also some elements of the profit approach are 
taken on board. Berger and Mester (2003) argue that the use of the profit approach may help take into account 
unmeasured changes in the quality of banking services by including the higher revenues paid for improved quality.  
Fourth, given the focus on the efficiency of banking sector in intermediating funds to the real sector, only loans to the 
domestic real sector are considered as an output and assets held in government securities, banks abroad, and inter-bank 
loans are excluded. Where banks invest a significant part of their assets in low-risk low-return foreign or domestic 
government securities, from the intermediation point of view it is preferable not to treat this part of assets as bank 
output. Also from the intermediation point of view non-loan assets incur little screening and monitoring costs and are 
excluded from the measures of financial development at the macroeconomic level. So in this context, net loans capture 
the output of banks from the intermediation point of view.  
Finally, the output nature of deposits (and non-loan earning assets) would be captured by the income from fees and 
commissions and interest income, respectively, which are incorporated in the total revenue variable. Hence, having 
total revenues on the output side would account for the output nature of banking services. Interest and non-interest 
expenses/revenues would capture the entire spectrum of banking activities, including off-balance sheet items, the lack 
of account of which is a criticism of the intermediation approach. Therefore, the ability of banks to transform deposits 
into loans and the ability to maximize revenues at given costs (and consequently better profits) would imply efficient 
intermediation. 
5. The intermediation efficiency of banks in SEE: empirical results 
In this section, both the CRS and VRS models are used to analyze the relative efficiency of banks in SEE. The 
common efficiency frontier for banks in the four SEE countries is estimated. Relative efficiency of banks for 
individual countries is assessed as well and results are broadly similar compared to the common frontier approach. 
Some important findings for individual countries are briefly discussed (the results for individual country DEA scores 
are available upon request to the authors). The output oriented multi-stage DEA model is utilized, using the DEAP 2.1 
software developed by Coelli (1996). The data for each bank are taken from the end-of-year balance sheet and income 
statements published by central banks in the respective countries.  
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The database virtually covers the entire banking system in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo and Montenegro. Strength of 
having the entire population of banks is that it would not suffer from the problem of DEA being a sample specific 
method, since the results obtained for a sample of banks may not be generalized for the entire population. For Bulgaria 
and Croatia the data are in local currencies and the official exchange rate is used to convert them to euro, and for 
Kosovo and Montenegro they are in euro. The dataset contains 86 banks in 2002, 83 in 2003, 78 in 2004 and 84 in 
2005. The sample size is increased in 2005 due to the inclusion of 10 banks from Montenegro. While the number of 
banks remained the same in Kosovo throughout the period, they continuously declined in Bulgaria and Croatia due to 
M&As and some bank closures.  
At the outset it should be noted that banking sectors in SEE countries continued the consolidation process in the 2002-
2005 period. This is especially the case with the banking sector in Croatia where the consolidation process involved 19 
banks in 12 M&As, and three bankruptcies. It is important to note that almost all banks involved in the consolidation 
process were foreign-owned. In Bulgaria the consolidation was less pronounced. It involved five banks undergoing 
M&As, three new entries and two exits. Usually motives for consolidation are attributed to the opportunities in 
exploiting economies of scale, such as spreading costs over a larger base, economies of scope, such as increasing the 
number of services offered, cross-selling, increasing customer base, etc. Other motives involve risk diversification, 
acquisition of the new technology or an increase in the market power – the latter may negatively affect efficiency. 
Two questions related to M&As will be addressed explicitly in this paper: (i) if scale efficiency improved and, (ii) if a 
shift in technology appeared in this period. On the other hand, Kosovo had stable structure of the banking sector in this 
period making an interesting case for comparison; while the data for Montenegro are available only for one year. The 
development of the banking sector in Kosovo is one of substantial expansion in all dimensions, although from a low 
base. From the regulatory point of view, it is worth mentioning that in Kosovo the upper limit of loan to deposit ratio 
is at 80 percent, in Croatia the reserve requirements increased several times in the 2002-2005 period in an attempt to 
curb the rapid credit expansion while Bulgaria introduced such measures in 2005. These measures also may have had 
an impact on the intermediation efficiency of banks in the region.  
5.1. A common frontier of banks in SEE  
In this section the efficiency of the SEE banking systems over the period 2002-2005 is assessed. Constructing a 
common frontier for different countries may pose some problems because of differences in macroeconomic, regulatory 
environment and accounting standards. However, there are justifications for considering that countries may be treated 
as largely homogenous because the period under review is characterized by a stable macroeconomic environment in 
the countries under investigation. Kosovo and Montenegro have no independent monetary policy as they are euroised 
economies while Bulgaria is quasi euroised with a currency board. Croatia is also highly euroised and loans and 
deposits are largely indexed to the euro. Foreign banks dominate all banking markets in the region. From the 
regulatory point of view all the countries have 'deregulated' markets, i.e. there are no controls on interest rates, capital 
flows, etc. Regarding the differences in accounting standards, the problem is attempted to be minimized by adopting 
broad definitions of inputs and outputs. Given the above, the procedure may be warranted.  
Table 2 presents the evolution of banking sector intermediation efficiency in the four countries. The average efficiency 
scores in the CRS model for the whole region fluctuate in the four years reaching their minimum in 2003 (0.679) and 
maximum in 2004 (0.714). In general, between 2002 and 2005, there seems to have been some marginal improvement 
in the efficiency of banks in the region, although there have been no large efficiency gains.  
The divergence among banks, as measured by the standard deviation, seems not to be negligible and varying yearly. In 
estimates for individual country cases, DEA scores show that the divergence between best and worst performing banks 
in the market is widening; foreign/larger banks are more efficient than domestic/small banks and the main source of 
inefficiency emanates from scale inefficiencies where most of the banks operate at decreasing returns to scale (DRS).  
As can be seen, Bulgarian banks are, on average, more efficient in intermediation than Croatian banks, while banks in 
Kosovo appears to be the least efficient compared to other countries in the region. DEA scores for Bulgaria only show 
that there was a drop in efficiency in Bulgarian banking sector in the period under review, mainly attributed to 
domestic banks and introduction to supplementary reserve requirements by the central bank to slow down rapid credit 
growth. Similar results seem to hold in 2005 when banks from Montenegro are included. Nonetheless, Montenegrin 
banks appear to be the most efficient ones, on average. The difference between the average of the least efficient 
banking system (Kosovo) and the most efficient system (Montenegro) in 2005 is around 22.1 percentage points. The 
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efficiency spreads between Bulgaria and Croatia are not as large (varying between three to five percentage points in 
different years). In general, the VRS model tells the same story. An exception is that in 2002 banks in Croatia are 
more efficient than banks in Bulgaria, pointing to the scale inefficiencies in the Croatian banking sector.  
Regarding the breakdown of banks by ownership, the results suggest that foreign banks on average outperform 
domestic banks in terms of average efficiency and the number of banks dominating the frontier and the gap was 
increasing over the years. 
Table 2. DEA efficiency scores of banks in SEE (2002-2005), CRS and VRS model 
            
  CRS 
  
VRS 
  2002 2003 2004 2005   2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of banks (of which foreign-owned) 86(44) 83(41) 78(39) 84(38) 86(44) 83(41) 78(39) 84(38) 
Number of efficient banks (of which foreign-owned) 5 (3) 7(5) 7(5) 6(4) 15 (10) 18(13) 17(14) 17(14) 
Average efficiency 0.684 0.679 0.714 0.693 0.812 0.780 0.791 0.778 
Standard deviation 0.153 0.169 0.144 0.151   0.150 0.161 0.156 0.163 
Country 
Average efficiency of banks in Bulgaria 0.699 0.708 0.751 0.708 0.818 0.808 0.822 0.789 
Average efficiency of banks in Croatia 0.696 0.676 0.698 0.664 0.843 0.787 0.789 0.772 
Average efficiency of banks in Kosova 0.532 0.556 0.618 0.593 0.574 0.604 0.654 0.659 
Average efficiency of banks in Montenegro na na na 0.814   na na na 0.844 
Ownership 
Average efficiency of foreign banks 0.693 0.695 0.736 0.725 0.827 0.825 0.842 0.824 
Average efficiency of domestic banks 0.672 0.658 0.687 0.649 0.792 0.720 0.727 0.714 
Efficiency Gap (Foreign - Domestic) 0.021 0.037 0.049 0.076   0.035 0.105 0.115 0.110 
Size  
First Quartile 0.700 0.718 0.748 0.718 0.796 0.755 0.778 0.764 
Second Quartile 0.633 0.608 0.652 0.618 0.766 0.727 0.711 0.698 
Third Quartile 0.673 0.705 0.774 0.760 0.876 0.917 0.929 0.930 
Fourth Quartile 0.795 0.631 0.661 0.707   0.968 0.938 0.961 0.959 
To explore further the differences in efficiency scores between foreign and domestic banks statistically the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney Rank-Sum test is used, as suggested by Cooper, et al. (2000), to test the null hypothesis that 
foreign and domestic banks are drawn from a population having the same distribution, i.e. whether the differences 
between the two groups are statistically significant. The results are presented in Table 3 for individual country cases 
and the SEE region as a whole.  
As can be observed from the table, the differences between efficiency scores of foreign and domestic banks are 
statistically significant at the five percent level in Bulgaria in 2003 and after (and at the ten percent level in the VRS 
model in 2005). In Croatia the differences are statistically significant only in 2005 at the ten percent level of 
significance, while in Kosovo the differences are statistically significant in favor of domestic banks. This is reversed in 
2004 in the VRS model only. In 2005, the differences between the efficiency scores of foreign and domestic banks are 
not significant in Kosovo or Montenegro. In the common sample of efficiency scores for banks in SEE countries the 
results indicate that the differences between foreign banks and domestic banks are more apparent only after 2003 and 
Toçi & Hashi/International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies Vol 2, No 3, 2013  ISSN: 2147-4486 
11 
 
it seems that the results are mainly driven by the difference between foreign banks and domestic banks in Bulgaria and 
in 2005 for Croatia, e.g. after the consolidation took place. 
Table 3. Foreign vs. Domestic bank DEA scores: Mann-Whitney Test 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Bulgaria 
    
CRS (z-stat) 1.135 2.399** 2.521** 2.145** 
VRS (z-stat) 0.510 2.241** 2.148** 1.590* 
Croatia 
    
CRS (z-stat) 0.594 0.209 1.478 1.614* 
VRS (z-stat) 0.608 0.478 1.294 1.878* 
Kosova 
    
CRS (z-stat) -6.898*** -6.061*** -1.784* 0.891 
VRS (z-stat) -2.221*** 0.164 2.612*** 0.478 
Montenegro 
    
CRS (z-stat) na na na -0.365 
VRS (z-stat) na na na 0.125 
SEE 
    
CRS (z-stat) 0.683 1.116 1.591* 2.430*** 
VRS (z-stat) 1.260 2.856*** 3.218*** 2.973*** 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
Regarding the difference in efficiency scores between banks of different size classes the evidence is not so clear 
(Table 2). For example, in the CRS model small banks in the first quartile are more efficient than larger banks (except 
in 2002 compared to fourth quartile and 2004-2005 compared to third quartile); while in the VRS model banks in third 
and fourth quartile appear the most efficient. If we recall that CRS is a product of technical and scale efficiency while 
VRS is a measure of pure technical efficiency, with any difference between the two reflecting scale inefficiencies. 
Table 4 presents scale inefficiencies of banks in SEE. As can be seen, while scale inefficiencies are not substantial for 
small banks, they appear to be considerable for large banks which generally operate under DRS – a greater efficiency 
would have been attained had they operated at lower scale. Banks in Croatia have the largest scale inefficiencies, 
followed by banks in Bulgaria. Also foreign banks seem to have higher scale inefficiencies than domestic banks. The 
consolidation of the banking sectors in Croatia, and to some extent Bulgaria, may be an explanation for this outcome. 
In general, the evidence suggests that economies of scale are exploited early in banking in terms of the size and that 
there is a general consensus that consolidation through M&As is beneficial up to a certain size, relatively small, in 
order to reap economies of scale (see for example, Ferrier and Lovell, 1990, McAllister and McManus, 1993, Amel et 
al., 2004). Consequently, the size of banks (in terms of total assets) exhibiting constant returns to scale (CRS) in 
Bulgaria and Croatia is explored. The average size of banks exhibiting CRS for the 2002-2005 period in Bulgaria was 
€116 million (minimum €63 million in 2002 and maximum €130 million in 2005). In Croatia the average size of banks 
exhibiting CRS was 141 million (minimum €20 million in 2002 and maximum €300 million in 2005), thus, 
confirming to some extent previous assertions that the scale economies in banking are not so large. However, there are 
two banks in Bulgaria with the asset size of around €400 million and two in Croatia with the asset size of around €1 
billion (one of which was not involved in M&A) that exhibit CRS. These exceptional cases make it difficult to specify 
the optimal scale size of banks since it depends on the characteristics of the particular market. 
While the optimal scale of operation in banking is difficult to ascertain, the results suggest that the greatest source of 
inefficiency in the SEE banks is scale inefficiency of large banks attributable to M&As. It should be noted, however, 
that it takes time for the positive effects of M&As to take place. This is because restructuring and integrating the 
acquired bank involves changes in organizational culture, operations, policies and procedures, and staff training to 
adapt to the new setting. It also involves branch and staff rationalization, staff turnover, change in cultures which may 
cause losses in customer relationships. From the results in the period under review it may be said that little gain in 
efficiency would be attained through M&As, especially for large banks, given they are generally operating at DRS. 
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The period under review in SEE is characterized by a growing economy and an increase in market demand that may 
have encouraged the banks’ excessive size. It appears that some banks attempted to become larger for positioning in 
the market and increase the market share, to preserve margins at the expense of scale economies. However, another 
motive may have been the acquisition of new technologies (explored in Section 7) which may be reflected in cost 
inefficiencies (Section 6.3).  
Several observations can be made so far. In the banking sectors in the SEE countries no substantial efficiency 
improvements are apparent and there seems to have no convergence in the banking market in terms of intermediation 
efficiency. A notable exception is Kosovo which is showing that the catching-up with other countries is maybe taking 
place, although still remaining the least efficient banking sector in the region. In general, foreign banks appear more 
efficient than domestic banks and the differences are widening. Regarding the performance of banks of different size, 
large banks are more efficient than small banks, though large banks suffer from scale inefficiencies and banking 
markets are characterized with excessive size. 
Table 4. Scale inefficiencies of banks in SEE, 2002-2005 
 
  2002   2003   2004   2005 
Average 0.157   0.130   0.097   0.109 
Country 
       
Bulgaria 0.145 
 
0.124 
 
0.086 
 
0.103 
Croatia 0.174 
 
0.141 
 
0.115 
 
0.140 
Kosova 0.073 
 
0.079 
 
0.055 
 
0.100 
Montenegro na   na   na   0.036 
Ownership 
       
Foreign banks 0.162 
 
0.158 
 
0.126 
 
0.120 
Domestic banks 0.152 
 
0.086 
 
0.055 
 
0.091 
Scale inefficiency Gap (Foreign - Domestic) 0.011   0.071   0.071   0.029 
Size  
       
First Quartile 0.121 
 
0.049 
 
0.039 
 
0.060 
Second Quartile 0.174 
 
0.164 
 
0.083 
 
0.115 
Third Quartile 0.232 
 
0.231 
 
0.167 
 
0.183 
Fourth Quartile 0.179   0.327   0.312   0.263 
Note: Scale inefficiency = 1-[(CRS/VRS)] 
    
6. Sensitivity tests 
In this section, the sensitivity of the DEA results is tested in three ways. First, whether the constructed frontier is 
influenced by outliers; second, whether the efficiency scores are stable over time; and third, whether the DEA scores 
are consistent with financial ratio analysis. 
6.1. Test for outliers   
As shown in the previous section, in the CRS model the efficiency frontier was determined by five to seven banks 
throughout the period. One possible problem with DEA is that the frontier may be defined by the outliers rather than 
the whole sample, e.g. because of data errors (Simar, 2003) and as such be susceptible to extreme observations. The 
results of the test for outliers are displayed in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients: test for outliers 
 
  
No. of efficient banks 
(original sample) 
No. of efficient banks 
(reduced sample) 
Rank-order correlation (all 
sample vs. reduced sample) Year 
  
2002 5 7 0.8867*** 
2003 7 11 0.9397*** 
2004 7 10 0.8645*** 
2005 6 10 0.9830*** 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
The first column shows the number of efficient banks that construct the frontier in the original sample. Next, these 
banks are deleted from the sample and the efficiency scores are re-estimated for the reduced sample (the number of 
efficient banks for the reduced sample is shown in the second column). Then the Spearman rank-order correlation is 
calculated between the two estimates of efficiency scores in the two samples and it is found that correlation 
coefficients are high (ranging from 0.86 to 0.98) and are statistically significant at the one percent level. Similarly, 
high correlation coefficients have been found in Berg, et al. (1993) ranging from 0.95 to 0.99 employing a similar 
procedure. This may indicate that the results are not sensitive to outliers, i.e. those banks that appeared as more 
efficient in the whole sample were likely to remain such in the reduced sample. 
6.2. Test for stability over time 
A test for the stability of efficiency scores over time is conducted since, as pointed out by Leong, et al. (2003), banks 
cannot genuinely be efficient in one year and then highly inefficient in the next year, except in extraordinary 
circumstances. If the DEA scores are stable over time, then the problem of noise due to measurement errors, luck and 
lack of comparable entities for banks dominating the frontier diminishes. Therefore, at least within a short period of 
time, it is desirable that the efficiency scores are reasonably stable. Leong, et al. (2003) find low stability of DEA 
efficiency scores over time in their study of the banking sector in Singapore (correlation coefficients ranging from 
0.14 to 0.06 within a three year time span). On the other hand, Bauer, et al. (1998) and Fiorentino, et al. (2006) in their 
studies of the banking sector in the U.S. and Germany, respectively, find quite large correlation coefficients ranging 
from 0.92 to 0.76 in a three year time span, suggesting that relative repositioning in the banking industry neither 
appears to occur quickly nor to a large extent. 
Table 6. Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients of efficiency measures over time 
 
    One year apart          (2005 vs. 
2004) 
Two years apart          (2005 vs. 
2003) 
Three years apart      (2005 vs. 
2002)     
CRS 2005 
 
0.7875*** 0.6905*** 0.6276*** 
VRS 2005   0.8717*** 0.7887*** 0.6834*** 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 6 contains the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients which represent the correlation of efficiency scores 
in 2005 with the scores in 2004, 2003 and 2002. As the results indicate, the coefficients are quite high and significant 
at the one percent level suggesting that many of the worst performers and best performers have tended to remain such 
over time. For example, the rank correlation coefficients for the CRS and VRS efficiency scores in 2005 with the CRS 
and VRS scores one year forward are 0.79 and 0.87, respectively. The correlation coefficients decrease over time as 
one would expect, but remain significant at one percent level suggesting that the model ranks banks fairly consistently 
over time. 
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6.3. DEA, Financial Ratios and Sources of Inefficiency 
Financial ratio analysis is often used by the bank management, regulators, financial analysts as well as researchers to 
evaluate bank performance based on some 'benchmarks' for the industry. One disadvantage of the ratio analysis is that 
each ratio must be compared with some benchmark ratios, one at a time, while assuming that other factors are fixed 
and that the benchmarks chosen are suitable for the purpose of comparison (Yeh, 1996). Among the most frequently 
used accounting ratios are return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) which proxy for bank efficiency in 
generating profits; cost to total asset ratio (CTA), cost to income ratio (C/I) and revenue to asset ratio (RTA) which are 
indicators of optimization in terms of bank costs and revenues; loans to total assets (LTA) and loans to total deposits 
(L/D) which show the extent to which assets/deposits are devoted to loans as opposed to other assets; capital to total 
assets ratio (CAR) which shows capital adequacy, etc. A desirable property of the DEA model is its usefulness for 
policy purposes in serving regulators in identifying the worst performing banks in the market. In banking studies, apart 
from the extensive use in efficiency measurement, DEA has also been proposed for use in monitoring and/or early 
warning systems by bank regulatory agencies since it has a strong empirical association with bank failures after the 
inefficiencies have been detected (Barr et al., 1994; Kao and Liu, 2004). As Bauer, et al. (1998) pointed out, ‘a 
positive correlation between efficiency scores (generated in DEA or parametric methods) and the usual ratios would 
be desirable because the authorities could be more confident that the measured efficiencies are accurate indicators of 
performance and not just artefact of the assumptions made regarding the underlying optimization concept, the 
inexistence of random error and, for parametric methods, the functional form assumptions and distributional 
assumptions of efficiency scores and the random error.’  
Table 7. Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients of efficiency measures and financial ratios 
 
      ROA ROE NIM C/I CTA RTA LTA L/D CAR 
CRS   
          
 
2002  0.3882*** 0.2936** 0.4873*** -0.4409*** -0.0126 0.2592** 0.6846*** 0.8311*** 0.2912** 
 
2003 
 
0.3195** 0.0211 0.4445*** -0.4705*** -0.0688 0.4434*** 0.7439*** 0.8735*** 0.5007*** 
 
2004 
 
0.4100*** 0.0842 0.4853*** -0.5323*** -0.0004 0.3907*** 0.6064*** 0.7555*** 0.4719*** 
  2005   0.4845*** 0.2074 0.4618*** -0.6110*** -0.1622 0.3600*** 0.5851*** 0.7873*** 0.4555** 
VRS   
          
 
2002 
 
0.4203*** 0.3294*** 0.2925** -0.4505*** -0.0694 0.2089* 0.3932*** 0.5159*** 0.2170* 
 
2003  0.3515*** 0.2759** 0.2139* -0.5300*** -0.2285* 0.1782 0.4929*** 0.5528*** 0.1445 
 
2004  0.3381*** 0.2526** 0.1857 -0.5528*** -0.2967** 0.0441 0.5075*** 0.5541*** 0.1803 
  2005   0.4483*** 0.3410*** 0.3024** -0.6092*** -0.3023** 0.1751 0.5904*** 0.7155*** 0.2693** 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; ROA (return on assets) is the ratio of pre-tax profit to total assets; ROE 
(return on equity) is the ratio of pre-tax profit to total equity; NIM (net interest margin) is the difference between the interest income and interest 
expenditures divided by total assets; C/I is the ratio of total costs to total income; CTA is the ratio of total costs to total assets; RTA is the ratio of 
total revenues to total assets; LTA is the ratio of loans to total assets; L/D is the ratio of loans to deposits; CAR (capital adequacy ratio) is the 
ratio of total equity to total assets.  
Table 7 presents the correlation coefficients of DEA efficiency scores with some broadly used financial ratios. As 
indicated in the table, the correlation coefficients are, in most cases, reasonably large and statistically significant. The 
largest correlation coefficients are exhibited with loan to deposit ratio (L/D) ranging from 0.52 to 0.87, loan to total 
assets ratio (LTA) ranging from 0.39 to 0.74, cost efficiency ratio (C/I) ranging from 0.44 to 0.61 – all statistically 
significant at one percent level – followed by profit to total assets ratio (ROA) ranging from 0.32 to 0.48. These 
correlation coefficients are higher than the ones reported in other studies. For example, Isik and Hassan (2002) find 
Toçi & Hashi/International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies Vol 2, No 3, 2013  ISSN: 2147-4486 
15 
 
correlation coefficients of efficiency scores with ROA, CTA and C/I ratios in range 0.30-0.40, Bauer, et al. (1998) in 
range 0.10-0.20, while Fiorentino, et. al. (2006) find even weaker correlation coefficients.  
 
Table 8. Statistical tests of differences in financial ratios for the best and the worst DEA performers (2005) 
 
  ROA ROE NIM C/I CTA RTA LTA L/D CAR 
CRS  
         
Banks (DEA=1) 3.78 20.77 5.82 60.76 5.70 9.79 68.96 91.60 29.77 
Banks (DEA<Average DEA) 0.89 1.52 3.57 84.93 6.98 8.23 47.06 54.91 10.84 
Mann-Whitney Test 
         
z-stat 2.331** 2.310** 1.626 -2.923*** -1.367 0.849 2.310** 3.441*** 3.365*** 
VRS  
         
Banks (DEA=1) 2.51 17.92 4.48 66.3 5.7 8.71 61.22 77.77 17.59 
Banks (DEA<Average DEA) 0.89 0.92 3.74 85.82 7.74 8.69 48.28 56.85 11.42 
Mann-Whitney Test 
         
z-stat 2.409** 1.880* 0.740 -3.791*** -3.041*** 0.454 3.060*** 3.791*** 1.630 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; ROA (return on assets) is the ratio of pre-tax profit to total assets; ROE (return on 
equity) is the ratio of pre-tax profit to total equity; NIM (net interest margin) is the difference between the interest income and interest expenditures divided 
by total assets; C/I is the ratio of total costs to total income; CTA is the ratio of total costs to total assets; RTA is the ratio of total revenues to total assets; 
LTA is the ratio of loans to total assets; L/D is the ratio of loans to deposits; CAR (capital adequacy ratio) is the ratio of total equity to total assets.  
 
Further, the average of selected ratios for the most efficient banks identified by DEA in the CRS and the VRS model 
are computed, i.e. frontier banks, and below average performers in the market, i.e. banks with below average DEA 
efficiency scores. As can be seen from the Table 8, on average, better DEA performers have also better financial ratios 
and the differences seem quite large. For example, more efficient banks have larger return indicators, are better in 
managing costs, are better capitalized, and are better in transforming assets/deposits into loans. Given the small 
sample size, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test is conducted in order to draw inference on the differences in 
accounting ratios between the 'best' and the 'worst' DEA performers. As can be observed from Table 8, in the both 
CRS and VRS models, significant differences appear for almost all the accounting ratios.  
The above results may suggest that inefficiencies originate in the process of transforming deposits into loans and 
extending loans as opposed to other assets as well as cost inefficiencies. However, as discussed earlier in this paper, 
the DEA method has the advantage of identifying the source of inefficiency directly. By constructing the frontier of 
best performers, best achievable output and input targets are computed. The difference between the actual 
outputs/inputs of inefficient units and outputs/inputs of best practice units may represent the sources of inefficiency. 
Calculating the mean values of output shortfalls for the sector and mean values of the excess use of inputs, and 
relating this to the mean value of actual outputs and inputs gives the value of inefficiencies for each input and output. 
By calculating this, results suggest that the greatest source of inefficiency are excess costs (2.60 percent), followed by 
a shortfall in loan extension (1.31 percent) – broadly in line with the ratio analysis. In all, the results show that the 
DEA model efficiency scores are comparable with most of the standard performance measures, indicating that using 
DEA in conjunction with the usual ratio analysis may be a useful tool. 
7. Total factor productivity change 
Table 9 presents the results of the Malmquist Index (MI) for the banking sector in SEE in the period 2002-2005. As 
can be seen, it appears that there was a minor improvement in MI (0.8 percent) in the SEE countries in terms of 
banking sector intermediation, driven by the change in technology (∆T) rather than the improvement in technical 
(∆PTE and ∆TE) and scale efficiencies (∆SE) – which generally exhibit efficiency decline. The technology shift effect 
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improved by 3.2 percent (∆T), which is offset by the catching-up effect with the overall decline of 2.3 percent (∆TE). 
The change in technology is positive in two years while negative in one and the opposite is true for other components. 
Technological progress characterized banks of all classes (by ownership, size and country), although banks in Kosovo, 
smaller and domestic banks showed lower progress. In terms of MI, however, the largest progress is apparent for the 
banks in Kosovo in all of its components in the period under review. This shows that Kosovo was catching-up with 
other countries in terms of financial intermediation. Croatia exhibits a declining MI in the period under review and the 
primary source is the decline in the technical and scale efficiency, while there is a positive shift in technology. 
Bulgaria, on the other hand, exhibits a small improvement in MI which is attributed entirely to the improvement in 
technology. Foreign banks showed MI growing, while domestic banks record a slight decline although the difference is 
not substantial. Both groups had an improvement in technology and for domestic banks the improvement is more 
apparent in the scale efficiency.  Regarding the change in MI by bank size, the results are not so clear. For example, all 
size groups recorded an improvement in technology, while larger banks (e.g. in third and fourth quartile) made an 
improvement in ∆PTE but faced a decline in ∆SE. 
Table 9. Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Change Index, (2002-2005) 
 
  ∆PTE ∆SE ∆TE ∆T MI 
Average 0.978 0.999 0.977 1.032 1.008 
Year           
2003 vs. 2002 0.941 0.972 0.914 1.141 1.043 
2004 vs. 2003 1.017 1.032 1.048 0.950 0.998 
2005 vs. 2004 0.976 0.994 0.968 1.009 0.980 
Country           
Bulgaria 0.979 0.998 0.977 1.035 1.011 
Croatia 0.967 0.992 0.959 1.030 0.988 
Kosova 1.022 1.050 1.064 1.029 1.096 
Ownership           
Foreign banks 0.997 0.985 0.981 1.036 1.016 
Domestic banks 0.955 1.019 0.972 1.028 0.998 
Size            
First Quartile 0.962 1.009 0.970 1.019 0.988 
Second Quartile  0.981 0.999 0.978 1.042 1.020 
Third Quartile 1.004 0.993 0.997 1.044 1.040 
Fourth Quartile 1.004 0.967 0.971 1.045 1.015 
Note: ∆PTE is the technical efficiency change due to VRS assumption; ∆SE is the scale efficiency change; ∆TE is the technical efficiency change 
due to the CRS assumption; ∆T is the technological change and MI is the total factor productivity change.  
In sum, a minor improvement is apparent in MI in the SEE banking sector, driven mainly by the change in technology. 
The largest improvement in all the MI components is apparent for Kosovo in the period under review and foreign 
banks show some improvement in MI as compared to their domestic counterparts. A shift in technology may be 
attributed to the fast technology advancement in Kosovo primarily because the banking sector had to introduce the 
whole set of banking products and services starting from branching network, ATMs, POS, e-banking, etc., which in 
turn were reflected in transitory cost inefficiencies. Other countries in the region were not subjected to the introduction 
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of the banking products and services from scratch and, hence, exhibited slower technology advancement. Overall, it 
seems that few banks took advantage of introducing new technologies while the average bank failed to keep up, 
leading to the divergence in the sector. 
8. Conclusions  
In this paper the intermediation efficiency of banks in four SEE countries over the period 2002-2005 was explored 
employing non-parametric techniques. The intermediation efficiency was measured by utilizing a two input-two 
output model for banks under investigation. Several findings emerged from the analysis. First, in the period 2002-
2005, the intermediation efficiency of banks in the region as a whole only showed a marginal improvement. This is 
particularly because banks, on average, failed to improve their efficiency as much as the few best performers that 
exhibited a shift in technology, giving a continuously widening divergence. Inefficiencies in the sector emanated from 
substantial scale and cost inefficiencies, lending shortfalls and possibly the regulatory measures imposed by the central 
banks in the region aimed at curbing the rapid credit expansion. Cost and scale inefficiencies are partly a reflection of 
the technology shift effect, i.e. due to transitory costs in the adoption of technological advances for upgrading banking 
products and services, a shift towards the segments of business such as the small business sector which are more costly 
to serve and partly due to mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that led to an inefficient scale of operation.  
Second, it was found that foreign banks (which are on average larger) were more efficient than domestic players and 
the gap had continuously widened. Foreign banks’ superior efficiency is identified despite the consolidation process 
through M&As largely involving these banks as in Croatia; start-up costs or costs of acquiring domestic banks; costs 
adopting new technologies or building them from scratch as in Kosovo; and costs in further building human capital 
which was generally lacking in the SEE. Third, in most cases larger banks were found to be more efficient than small 
banks, although experiencing substantial scale inefficiencies and exhibiting decreasing returns to scale, i.e. larger 
banks operated at excessive size. Fourth, regarding individual countries, the Kosovo banking system was found to be 
the least efficient in intermediation compared to other countries, although improvement and a catching-up effect has 
taken place over time. This is particularly because of the young banking sector that needed to expand its activities 
reflected in substantial scale and cost inefficiencies in the short-run and the risk perception of bankers and/or the 
regulator entailing lending shortfalls and high provisioning. 
Some important policy guidelines emerge from the analysis. Given scale inefficiencies detected in the banking sectors 
in the SEE in the period under review, especially for larger/foreign banks exhibiting decreasing returns to scale, 
policymakers should carefully examine any M&A proposal involving the large players. First, M&As should be 
assessed on the basis of whether they create efficiency gains or increase the market power in already concentrated 
markets. A common motive for consolidation is gains in scale and scope economies, cost saving and revenue 
enhancement. Evidence from this paper suggests that these aims may have not been fulfilled, at least in the short-run. 
The absence of efficiency improvement due to M&As may indicate some degree of market power exploitation. 
Although there may be positive benefits of consolidation over a longer period than considered in this study (with 
changing policies and procedures and staff training to adaptation to new conditions, staff turnover, changes in 
customer relationships, change in organizational cultures, etc.), the evidence presented here is an important factor for 
policy makers to take account of in decision making. In terms of efficiency improvements, it is possible that M&As 
involving small/domestic banks that generally exhibit increasing returns to scale would be more appropriate since the 
DEA results, in line with most of other findings in the literature, suggest that the scale efficiencies in banking are 
exhausted early. 
Second, in so far as M&As lead to a small number of large players in the market, policy makers may be concerned that 
that the new large banks may be oriented towards lending to large corporate clients (e.g. Berger et al., 2001 and 
DeHaas et al., 2007 for recent evidence in TEs). Hence, the small business sector may be left relatively underserved 
and credit constrained. To the extent that large banks have a competitive disadvantage in lending to small firms, 
several lending technologies, other than those based on financial statement data which may be unavailable to small 
firms, has been proposed in order to overcome this disadvantage (Berger and Udell, 2006): collateral-based lending, 
credit-scoring, factoring, leasing, etc. However, institutional quality plays a crucial role in, among others, the ability of 
banks to adopt various lending technologies. For example, collateral-based lending and factoring depends directly on 
the enforcement of collateral and other laws on contracts and lending based on credit-scoring depends directly on the 
functioning of credit registers and other information infrastructures. Hence, poor institutions make it ambiguous 
whether these lending technologies can be advanced to overcome a competitive disadvantage of large banks to lending 
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to small firms. In the view of competitive pressures from large/often foreign banks, on small/often domestic banks, the 
latter need to find market niches such as targeting small firms. Small domestic banks may have a competitive 
advantage serving the small business sector based on relationship lending and 'soft' information.  
The central banks should pay careful attention to banks that fail to acquire new technologies and become increasingly 
inefficient as they may be forced to exit the market and create instability in the banking sector. This is particularly 
important as the detected inefficiencies in the literature using DEA have been found to have a good predictive power 
for bank failures. As shown in this paper, the sensitivity tests indicate that the DEA efficiency scores are stable over 
time, not sensitive to outliers and broadly consistent with ratio analysis. One implication for the central banks is that, 
apart from methods utilized in assessing bank performance such as the CAMEL technique (which is based on financial 
ratios), the adoption of DEA could be a supplementary early warning tool. However, this depends crucially on the 
appropriate statistical information and supervisory capacity in detecting misreporting on time. Also one possible 
explanation for the intermediation inefficiencies detected using DEA was the regulatory measures imposed by the 
central banks to curtail credit expansion, such as supplementary reserve requirements for banks in which credit growth 
is higher than the growth in total assets. Given the predominance of household loans in bank portfolios, these 
measures may disproportionately affect credit to the enterprise sector and subsequently small firms. Hence, an 
implication for the central banks is that the imposed measures targeting the restrain of credit growth should 
discriminate between household and lending to enterprises. 
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